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Abstract
With the standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides labor market with frictions we
analyze when there is more employment with individual wage setting compared to
collective wage setting, using a wage equation generated by the standard total surplus
sharing rule. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function (AL,  < 1) we nd that
if the bargaining power of the individual is high compared to the bargaining power of
the union there is more unemployment with individual wage setting and the opposite
is also true. When the individual worker and the union have the same bargaining
power, if the cost of open a vacancy is high enough, there is more unemployment with
individual wage setting. Finally, for a constant marginal product of labor production
function AL, when the individual worker and the union have the same bargaining
power, individual bargaining produces more unemployment.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze which bargaining system: individual or collective generates more
unemployment, in a Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (DMP) labor market using a
wage equation derived from the usual surplus sharing rule in both systems. In general,
models with frictional unemployment assume individual wage bargaining and only few
papers analyze collective bargaining. Pissarides (1986) and Bauer and Lingens (2013)
analyze under which conditions collective wage bargaining is e¢ cient. Ebell and Haefke
(2006), in a model with imperfect competition in the goods market, study which bargain-
ing regime emerges as the stable institution. De la Croix (2006), in a model with imperfect
competition in the goods market, the e¤ect of di¤erent collective wage setting systems on
employment. García and Sorolla (2013) in a model with matching frictions where matches
last for one period which wage setting system generates frictional unemployment and Ran-
jan (2013) the role of labor market institutions on o¤shoring. Nevertheless none of the
papers compares the same wage setting structure for both systems of wage setting, in this
paper we compare individual and collective wage setting when both wages and employ-
ment are set at the same time or without commitment. The novelty of the paper is to
derive the collective wage setting equation applying Ranjan (2013) approach to case where
wages and employment are set simultaneously and wages are negotiated and compare the
equilibrium with the one obtained with standard wage setting equation obtained with in-
dividual bargaining in Pissarides (2000). The di¤erence with the collective wage equation
obtained in Ranjan (2013) is that he considers the union monopoly model when a union
sets unilaterally the wage before employment is decided.
Our results say that for a Cobb-Douglas production function, AL,  < 1, if the
bargaining power of the individual is high enough compared to the one of the union there
is more unemployment at the individual level and the opposite is also true. When the
individual and the union have the same bargaining power with respect to the rm, if the
cost of open a vacancy is high enough there is more unemployment when wages are set
individually. Finally, for a constant marginal product of labor production function AL,
when the individual worker and the union have the same bargaining power individual
bargaining produces more unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the standard
pieces of the DMP model that one can nd in any exposition of the model (for example
Pissarides (2000) or Cahuc et al. (2014)) and that will be used later: the equilibrium labor
market ows equation, the employment equation, and the value functions in the steady
state. In section 3 we derive the individual wage equation and in section 4 the collective
wage equation. The nal section compares both equilibria and states the main results.
2
2 The Market Economy
2.1 Labor Market Flows
We assume matching frictions in the labor market where the matching function is X(t) =
m(V (t); U(t)) where X are matches1, V vacancies and U the amount of unemployment.
Then U = (N   L) where N is the total size of the work force that is constant and L is
employment. We assume that m has constant returns to scale and mV > 0 and mU > 0.
Then we dene X
V
= m(1; 1V
U
)  q() where   V
U
is the degree of the labor market
tightness, and one can show that q0 < 0. Also we dene X
U
= V
U
X
V
= q() where one can
show that d(q())
d
> 0. Assuming that a proportion 0 <  < 1 of employed people loose
the job, then employment ows are given by the di¤erential equation:
_L = X   L = q()V   L = q()V
U
U   L = q()(N   L)  L. (1)
When the labor market ows are in equilibrium _L = 0 the equilibrium labor markets
ows equation (the Beveridge curve) is:
L =
"
1
1 + 
q()
N
#
(2)
where an increase in  increases employment.
2.2 The Multiple-Worker (Large) Firm
We assume a production function Y = F (L) with F 0 > 0. The rm chooses simultaneously
L and V (vacancies) in order to maximize its value function VF , that is, the sum of
discounted prots along life,
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt [F (L)  !L  0V ] dt, (3)
where ! is the real wage, r the real interest rate, 0 the cost of open a vacancy, subject
to the employment ow equation given by (1), that is, the rm maximizes:
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt
"
F (L)  !L  0
_L+ L
q()
#
dt
if we assume that  is constant (steady state), the rst order condition gives the
standard employment equation:
1t is a continuos variable and omitted when not necessary.
3
FL(L) = ! + 0
r + 
q()
. (4)
that says that the benets of employing an additional unit of labor (a match) FL !
r+
is
equal to its cost 0
q()
2. We assume that 0 is proportional to the wage that is 0 = !
3.
and then the employment equation is:
FL(L) =

1 + 
(r + )
q()

! (5)
where an increase in ! and  reduce employment.
2.3 Value Functions in the Steady State
We denote the value function of an employed worker, that is, his expected discounted
labor income along life that takes into account that he can change from employment to
unemployment with the constant probability  as VE. Then, as usual, the following asset
value equation holds (see for example Cahuc et al. (2014) equation (10.6) or Pissarides
(2000) equation (1.11)):
rVE = ! + (VU   VE). (6)
We denote the value function of an unemployed worker as VU and if  is constant, that
is, in an steady state, the following asset value equation holds4:
rVU = b0 + q()(VE   VU). (7)
We know that the value function of the rm, its expected discounted prots, is
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt [F (L)  !L  !V ] dt =
Z 1
0
e rt
"
F (L)  !L  !
_L+ L
q()
#
dt
In an steady state where _L = 0 we get
VF =
Z 1
0
e rt

F (L)  !L  ! L
q()

dt
Then the value asset equation implies
rVF =

F (L)  !L  ! L
q()

,
2See equation (3.7) in Pissarides (2000) or equation (9.46) in Cahuc et al. (2014).
3This assumption is standard in the literature, see the discussion on Pissarides (2000), P. 10 or P.74.
4Pissarides (2000), equation 1.10 and Cahuc et al. (2014) equation 9.14.
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that is,
VF =
h
F (L)  !L  ! L
q()
i
r
. (8)
Finally we need to know the value function of a rm of hiring an extra worker V 0F at
the steady state, that is5
rV 0F = [FL   !]  V 0F
or:
V 0F =
FL   !
r + 
. (9)
3 Individual Wage Setting
We consider the Nash situation where L and ! are set at the same time or without
commitment. When there is individual wage setting each individual worker bargains the
wage with the rm. Then, when deciding the wage the function to maximize is
(VE   VU)I (V 0F )1 I (10)
where (VE   VU) is the surplus that a worker gets if hired, V 0F is the surplus that the
rm gets if it hires an extra worker and I is the bargaining power of the individual worker.
This is the usual surplus sharing rule for individual wage setting, used normally in
models with matching frictions. Then with individual wage setting the wage is chosen in
order to maximize (10) subject to (6) and (9), then the function to maximize is:
!   rVU
r + 
I FL(L)  !
r + 
1 I
(11)
that gives as a rst order condition6:
! = (1  I)rVU + IFL(L).
One can also show that the rst order condition imply that total surplus (VE   VU + V 0F )
is divided in such a way that:
(VE   VU) = I(VE   VU + V 0F ),
5Pissarides (2000) equation (1.14) and Cahuc et al. (2014) equation 9.10.
6Pissarides (2000) equation 1.18.
5
that is
(1  I)(VE   VU) = IV 0F . (12)
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the marginal
product of labor. It is important to note that, because the wage is bargained between an
employed worker and the rm we substitute VE   VU using only the asset value equation
of an employed worker as Pissarides (2000) does on P.16. In the collective wage setting
case when a union represents both employed and unemployed workers we will use the asset
value equations of an employed and an employed worker to substitute VE   VU .
Using (7) we get
! = (1  I)b0 + (1  I)q()(VE   VU) + IFL(L)
Note that the wage setting rule says that the wage depends positively on the unem-
ployment benet. Using (12) and (9) one gets
! = (1  I)b0 + Iq()V 0F + IFL(L) = (1  I)b0 + Iq()

FL(L)  !
r + 

+ IFL(L).
and nally using (5)7
! = (1  I)b0 + I! + IFL(L).
Assuming that b0 = b! such that b < 1then the individual wage equation is given by
!I = mIFL =
I
1  (1  I)b  I
FL(L), (13)
that is the wage is a proportion mI =
I
1 (1 I)b I of the marginal product of labor
that depends on , having that an increase in  increases the wage.
4 Collective Wage Setting
When there is collective wage setting we assume that a union that represents both em-
ployed and unemployed workers bargains the wage with the rm8. In this case the function
to maximize is9 
L
N
VE +
(N   L)
N
VU

  VU

N
C
(SF )
1 C (14)
7This is Pissarides (2000) equation 1.20 when 0 = !, that is ! = (1  I)b0 + I [FL(L) + 0].
8Pissarides (1986) and Ranjan (2013) assume that the union sets unilaterally the wage.
9This is the extension of the function proposed by Ranjan (2013) when the wage is negotiated.
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where

L
N
VE +
(N L)
N
VU

is the expected value function of a worker and then

L
N
VE +
(N L)
N
VU

 
VU is the expected surplus of a worker. On the other hand SF is the surplus that the rm
gets when employing L workers. Finally C is the bargaining power of the union. Alter-
natively one may consider that in the collective bargaining system a union that represents
only employed workers (insiders) bargains the wage with the rm, in this case the function
to maximize is10
[(VE   VU)L]C (SF )1 C (15)
Note that operating (14) gives also (15). There are many options for dening the
surplus of the rm, SF , when there is agreement in the bargaining process and it employs
L workers. We assume, as Ebell and Haefke (2006), that in the event of disagreement
the rm is dissolved but, di¤erent from them, he must pay the costs of open vacancies
because, by symmetry to the individual wage setting, they have been predetermined in
advance11, in which case SF =
[F (L) !L]
r
. Then with collective wage setting the wage is
chosen in order to maximize:
[(VE   VU)L]C

[F (L)  !L]
r
1 C
(16)
subject to (6) and (7).
Substituting VE   VU from (6) and (7) as in Ranjan (2013)12 we obtain VE   VU =
! b0
r++q()
and then the objective function is:
(1  w)!   b0
r + + q()

L
C  [F (L)  !L]
r
1 C
(17)
that gives the wage equation:
! = (1  C)b0 + C

F (L)
L

,
where in this case the wage depends on the average product of labor or labor produc-
tivity13.
10This is the objective function proposed by Ebell and Haefke (2006) and Bauer and Lingens (2013).
As we said Ranjan (2013) and Pissarides (1986) consider the case where the union sets unilaterally the
wage maximizing
h
L
N VE +
(N L)
N VU

  VU
i
N = [(VE   VU )L] and V CE V (1 C)U respectively.
11Ebell and Haefcke (2006) assume that if the rm is disolved he has not to pay the cost of open
vacancies in which case SF = VF . All the results derived below are also true for this case. On the
other hand, Bauer and Lingens (2013) assume that if the rm is separated from its current employees
and time is continuous he can start producing in the next instant with new employees in which case:
SF = VF  
h
VF   ! Lq()
i
= ! Lq() .
12The di¤erence with the case in which the union cares only about employed workers (insiders) is that
in this case one computes VE   VU only using (6) that is the usual assumption in the literature.
13Considering Ebell and Haefke (2006) case where SF = VF the wage equation is
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Assuming also that b0 = b! the wage equation becomes:
!C = mC
F (L)
L
=
c
[1  (1  c)b]

F (L)
L

, (18)
where now the wage is a proportion mC =
c
[1 (1 c)b] of the average product of labor.
5 Equilibrium
As we said, the employment equation is given by:
FL(L) = !

1 + 
(r + )
q()

(19)
and substituting the individual wage equation (13) in the employment equation (19)
one gets the equilibrium labor market equation that gives :
FL(L) =
I
1  (1  I)b  I
FL(L)

1 + 
(r + )
q()

,
and, simplifying, with individual wage setting I is given by:
1  b
I
+ b  I =

1 + 
(r + )
q(I)

. (20)
Substituting the collective wage equation (18) in the employment equation (19) one
gets
FL(L) =
c
[1  (1  C)b]

F (L)
L
 
1 + 
(r + )
q()

:
If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, F (L) = AL, we have F (L)
L
= 1

FL(L) and
one obtains:
FL(L) =
c
[1  (1  C)b]
1

FL(L)

1 + 
(r + )
q()

and, simplifying, with collective wage setting C is given by14:


1  b
C
+ b

=

1 + 
(r + )
q(C)

. (21)
Then, comparing both equilibria given by (20) and (21), one obtains the following
propositions:
! = (1  C)b0 + C

F (L)
L
1
[1+ (r+)q() ]

that is similar to the wage equation WS that appears in Bauer
and Lingens (2013).
14If SF = VF equilibrium with collective wage setting gives 
h
1 b
C
+ b
i
=
h
1 + rq(C)+
i
.
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Proposition 1 If I is high enough I < C and then LI < LC : If C is high enough
C < I and then LC < LI .
Proof: The right hand side of equations (20) and (21) is identical15, equal to one when
 = 0 and increasing in  because q0 < 0. The left hand side of equation (21) is constant,
that is, is a constant straight line, and if 
h
1 b
C
+ b
i
> 1 and equilibrium with collective
wage setting exists. The left hand side of equation (20) is equal to 1 b
I
+ b when  = 0 and
decreases with , that is, is a straight line with negative slope , then, for a positive Ih
1 b
I
+ b
i
> 1 and an equilibrium with individual wage setting exists. If I is high enough
then
h
1 b
I
+ b
i
is low enough with respect 
h
1 b
C
+ b
i
and the straight line with negative
slope crosses to the right hand side curve below the crossing of the constant straight line
and the right hand side curve, then I < C and, using the equilibrium labor market ows
equation, LI < LC . The opposite occurs when C is high enough because 
h
1 b
C
+ b
i
is
low enough with respect
h
1 b
I
+ b
i
and the constant straight line crosses to the right hand
side curve below the crossing of the straight line with negative slope and the right hand
side curve, then c < I and, using the equilibrium labor market ows equation, LC < LI .
When I = C =  one can prove the following.
Proposition 2 If I = C =  and  is high enough then there is more unemployment
with individual wage setting.
Proof: In this case the value of the straight line is 
h
1 b

+ b
i
and the intercept of
the straight line with negative slope  is
h
1 b

+ b
i
. Then if  is big enough the straight
line with negative slope is really steeper crossing to the right hand side curve below the
crossing of the constant straight line and the right hand side curve, then I < C and,
using the equilibrium labor market ows equation, LI < LC .
Finally, if the production function is F (L) = AL, that is  = 1; then the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 3 If  = 1 and I = C =  then there is more unemployment with
individual wage setting.
Proof: in this case the constant straight line corresponds to 1 b

+ b and the intercept
of the straight line with negative slope is also 1 b

+ b which means that when  is positive
the straight line with negative slope is below the constant straight line and intersects the
right hand side curve for a lower , then I < C and, using the equilibrium labor market
ows equation, LI < LC .
15When SF = VF the one corresponding to collective bargaining for a positive  is below the one
corresponding to individual bargaining.
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The general intuition for the results is the following: The wage setting system that
generates more unemployment is the one that sets the higher wage, because the wage
in the individual wage setting system depends basically on the bargaining power of the
individual (I ) and the cost of open a vacancy () and, in the collective wage setting
system, on the bargaining power of the union (C ) and the parameter of the production
function (, where F (L) = AL ) one plays with these parameters for achieving the results.
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